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National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF)



Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs)

Maritime Security Program (MSP)

Maritime Liaison Agent Training Program (MLATP)

AAPA Port Security Seminar – 10 March 2015

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Agenda



- **NJTTF Overview**
- **Maritime Security Program (MSP)**
- **Maritime Liaison Agent (MLA)**
- **FBI's Maritime Responsibilities and Capabilities**



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National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF)



- Established in the wake of the 9/11 attacks
- Multi-agency task force representing 41 government agencies & critical industry representatives
- Collocated at the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).



Counterterrorism Division



Domestic Terrorism Operations Section



NJTTF



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NJTTF Mission



To enhance communication, coordination and cooperation between federal, state and local government agencies representing the *intelligence, law enforcement, defense, diplomatic, public safety, transportation, and homeland security* communities by:

- Providing a point of fusion for the sharing of terrorism threats and intelligence.
- Providing operational support to the FBI Counterterrorism Division, Intelligence Community, and Law Enforcement.
- Providing program management, oversight, and support for the JTTFs throughout the United States.

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41 NJTTF Member Agencies

1. Air Force Office of Special Investigations
2. Amtrak Police
3. Army Criminal Investigation Division
4. Army G2X
5. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco Firearms and Explosives
6. Bureau of Prisons
7. Capitol Police
8. Citizenship & Immigration Service
9. Coast Guard Investigative Service
10. Customs and Border Protection
11. Customs and Border Protection – Office of Field Operations
12. Defense Criminal Investigative Service
13. Defense Intelligence Agency – Defense Counterintelligence and HUMINT Center (DCHC)
14. Defense Intelligence Agency – Defense Combating Terrorism Center (DCTC)
15. Department of Agriculture - Office of Inspector General
16. Department of Energy
17. Department of State –Diplomatic Security Service
18. Department of Interior
19. Department of Transportation
20. Drug Enforcement Administration
21. Environmental Protection Agency – OCEFT
22. Federal Air Marshal Service
23. Federal Bureau of Investigation
24. Federal Emergency Management Agency
25. Federal Protective Service
26. Food & Drug Administration – OCI
27. Immigration and Customs Enforcement - Enforcement Removal Operations
28. Immigration and Customs Enforcement - Homeland Security Investigations
29. Internal Revenue Service – CID
30. U.S. Marshals Service
31. Metro Transit Police (D.C.)
32. Naval Criminal Investigative Service
33. New York Police Department
34. Norfolk Southern Railroad Police Department
35. Northern Command
36. U.S. Park Police
37. Pentagon Force Protection Agency
38. U.S. Postal Inspection Service
39. U.S. Secret Service
40. Transportation Security Administration – Office of Intelligence
41. Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration


9 DOD- 22%

28 Fed (Non-DOD)- 68%

4 State/Local/Other- 10%



National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF)





Maritime Security Program (MSP)



Mission: To prevent, penetrate and dismantle criminal acts of terrorism directed against **maritime assets** and provide **counterterrorism preparedness leadership and assistance** to federal, state and local agencies responsible for maritime security.

How the mission is accomplished:

- Maritime training for Maritime Liaison Agents (MLA)
- Identify/share maritime-specific intelligence
- Operational working groups
- National maritime policies and strategies
- Port visits & security assessments



Maritime Security Working Groups



Liaison with other government agencies and stakeholders at the national level:

- White House National Security Council
 - Maritime Security Interagency Policy Committee (MSIPC)
 - Maritime Security Working Group (MSWG) with several subgroups
 - Participate in the development of national maritime policies and strategies
- National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office (NMIIO), under the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)
 - NMIC Interagency Advisory Group (NIAG)
- Cruise Ship Security Working Group
 - Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA)
- Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR)



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Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR)



- MOTR: A presidentially-directed federal interagency process to achieve coordinated action & desired outcomes
- The MOTR Plan directs the establishment of an integrated network of existing national-level maritime command & operations centers to achieve coordinated, unified, timely and effective planning and mission accomplishment by the U.S. Government
- The MOTR Plan establishes protocols for initiating real-time Federal interagency communication, coordination, & decision-making through the integrated network of command centers when MOTR is triggered

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The MOTR Process



- A trigger is met and the MOTR process begins.
- Notification is provided to command watch centers and designated agency representatives.
- Multiple agencies come together in a single forum to ensure unity of federal-government effort.
- Facts are presented, authorities, capabilities and capacity discussed and a desired national outcome is decided along with the necessary operational coordination (e.g., designation of lead and supporting agencies, courses of action, public affairs guidance).
- Agencies implement the agreed upon courses of action in accordance with their procedures.
- The MOTR coordination activity is recorded and distributed across affected agencies.



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


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DOJ/FBI Roles in MOTR



- DOJ/FBI Roles and Responsibilities:
 - DOJ, through the FBI, is the lead MOTR agency for investigations of **terrorist acts or terrorist threats** by individuals or groups inside of the United States, or directed at U.S. citizens or institutions abroad where such acts are within the federal criminal jurisdiction of the U.S.
 - The FBI is responsible for **coordinating the activities of other members of the law enforcement community** to detect, prevent, preempt and disrupt terrorist attacks against the U.S.
 - The FBI is the lead MOTR agency for **intelligence collection in the U.S.**
 - The MSP serves as the FBI's **primary MOTR representative.**



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Maritime Liaison Agent (MLA)



- Initiated by the NJTTF
 - Field planning started in March 2004
 - Formally initiated in July 2004
 - Designated FBI Agents and JTTF members operating in field offices with navigable waterways

MLA Program Goal

To enhance the security of the maritime environment through increased interaction between MLAs, State and local authorities, and other Federal agencies with maritime responsibilities, including stakeholders and private industry.





Maritime Liaison Agent (MLA)



■ Functional Relationship Building

- US Coast Guard
- Coast Guard Investigative Service (CGIS)
- Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS)
- Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)
- Customs Border Protection (CBP)
- Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE)
- US Department of Agriculture (USDA)
- State/Local Authorities
- Area Maritime Security Committee (AMSC)
- Port Industry Stakeholders
- Special Interest/Niche Businesses
- Visible Intermodal Prevention & Response (VIPR) Teams
- Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Program





Port Visits



- Quarterly visit to Field Offices and port facilities
- Facilitated through local MLA
- Identify/share best practices
- Understand operational challenges and security concerns



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Maritime Liaison Agent (MLA)



- MLA Training Program (MLATP)
 - 1-week - FLETC, Charleston, SC
 - Maritime threats
 - Maritime Law
 - Vessel familiarization
 - Port operations
 - Cargo inspections
 - Boarding Procedures
 - Maritime intelligence
 - Water survival
 - Classroom / Practical
 - In conjunction with NCIS and USCG
 - 4 courses per year





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FBI's Maritime Responsibilities



- Counterterrorism Division (CTD)
- Criminal Investigative Division (CID)
- Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG)
- Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Directorate
- Laboratory Division (LAB)
- Counterintelligence Division



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Criminal Investigative Division (CID)

Investigates Crimes on the High Seas (to include Piracy), Crimes aboard Aircraft, and other Transportation Crimes.

Areas of Activity:

- Interference with Flight Crew & threats
- Destruction of aircraft
- Carriage of weapons
- Hijacking and contingency plans
- Interstate transportation of stolen aircraft
- Laser incidents
- Cargo/ticket theft
- Suspected unapproved aircraft parts
- Coordination with FBI Lab/BDC regarding explosives
- Crash investigation w/ NTSB and aviation operations

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Critical Incident Response Group

- Hazardous Devices Operations Section
- Investigative and Operations Support Section
 - Crisis Negotiation Unit (CNU)
 - Rapid Deployment Logistics Unit
- Strategic Information and Operations Center
- Surveillance and Aviation Section
- Tactical Section
 - Hostage Rescue Team (HRT)
 - Operations and Training Unit (OTU)
 - SWAT Operations Unit (SOU)
 - Tactical Helicopter Unit (THU)



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Critical Incident Response Group



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


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Lab Operational Support Branch

- Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU)
 - Hazardous Materials Response Teams (HMRT)
 - Fly-Away Laboratory
- Evidence Response Team Unit (ERTU)
 - Evidence Response Teams (ERT)
 - Underwater Search and Evidence Response Teams (USERT)



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WMD Directorate



- Provides leadership, guidance, and expertise to the U.S. government on WMD issues
- Responsible for coordinating WMD operational efforts through field-based WMD & counterproliferation coordinators
- 4 Functional Categories: Preparedness, countermeasures, investigations/operations, and intelligence
- Maintains robust response capability to:
 - collect evidence in contaminated areas
 - disarm hazardous devices
 - provide direct command and control support in on-scene situations
- WMD Coordinator in each Field Office



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Layered Defense





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Use of Waterborne Improvised Explosive Devices (WBIEDs)



- Oct 2002 – Al-Qaeda directed attack by an explosive-laden small boat against a French oil tanker M/V LIMBURG, Yemen



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UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Use of Waterborne Improvised Explosive Devices (WBIEDs)



- Oct 2000 – Al-Qaeda attacked the U.S. COLE, 17 U.S. Navy sailors killed. Navigating an explosive-laden small boat alongside the destroyer while refueling in Aden, Yemen.





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Threat

WBIED incidents in the US



- Estimate for domestic maritime IED incidents are on the order of 10 per year
 - Approximately 50% above water, 50% below water
 - Not including routine seal bomb, flare, and panga incidents
 - Concentrated in port/coastal areas, but not limited to these
 - Consistent with worldwide figures
 - In the last 30 years less than 2% of terrorist attacks were maritime
- *There is demonstrated intent and capability in the construction, functionality and potential lethal effect of WBIEDs in the US by domestic actors*
- *And there is ample awareness of the potential impact of a maritime attack by VEOs*



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Threat

WBIED incidents in the US



- We define the threat and environments in order to determine the scope of our mission
- Two basic types of maritime incidents we are focused on:
 - Above water hazardous device
 - Floating
 - Adjacent/Near port infrastructure or ships in US waters
 - Underwater hazardous device (UHD)
 - Purpose Built UWIED
 - Surface IED placed/discarded in water
- *In instances where devices found are ordinance, DSCA support will be needed per EPA MMR (40 CFR...)*
- *For IEDs, PSBS will takes lead, but DSCA may be needed if:*
 - *Highly complex attack and/or*
 - *PS resources exceeded*



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Known Incidents Examples

Waterborne IED (WBIED)



- DATE: 22 APR 2010
- UNIT: Miami Dade County Police Department (MDPD/BDU)
- TYPE: Floating WBIED (Actual)
- BATS ID: Unknown
- LOCATION: Near Fowey Rocks Lighthouse off the coast of Key Biscayne, FL
- NARRATIVE: Discovered WBIED floating near Fowey Rocks Lighthouse off the coast of Key Biscayne, FL. Item was rudimentary in appearance, consisting of a gasoline-filled bottle w/ attached timer. Device failed to detonate due to improperly waterproofing the TPU. Intended target unknown.
- COMMENTS: Senior member of team slipped and fell while boarding police patrol boat at pier, possibly due to a previous orthopedic injury. Must ensure team members have up to date medical certification in order to conduct high risk operations to include boat boarding.



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Known Incidents Examples

Underwater Hazardous Device (UHD)



- DATE: 11 SEP 2013
 - UNIT: Kanawha County Sherriff's Dept. Bomb Squad
 - TYPE: Actual UHD
 - BATS ID: 306845
 - LOCATION: Belle, WV
 - NARRATIVE: "While diving in a containment pond two pipe bombs were located on the bottom. IED #1 is a PVC pipe with fusing protruding from one end. The IED was attached to a rock with black electrical tape. IED #2 is a CO2 aluminum container, with fusing protruding from one end. It was also attached to a rock with black electrical tape"
-
- *These item apear to have been landside IEDs that were disposed in the water.*
 - *Would Navy EOD have responded to this if requested? If so, in how long? Is this a wise use of resources?*



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Known Incidents Examples

Underwater Hazardous Device (UHD)



- In 2005 a suspicious device (two 55 gallon drums) was discovered tied to a pier in the port of Savannah, GA. The local PSBS was notified and in turn contacted the nearest Navy EOD Detachment (Mayport, FL). The EOD Det immediately sent a single representative to advise the local bomb squad, but would not conduct diving or in water operations.
- If a Navy in-water response was needed, local authorities were told it would take 5-7 days and would require higher level approval.
 - *Incident was prosecuted by local bomb squad in consultation with FBI CIED Unit, by remotely beaching items and conducting landside diagnostics.*
 - *Item ultimately determined to be an poorly placed and labeled meteorological sensor package, but caused a major disruption of Savannah River traffic.*



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Domestic Maritime IED Attack

What about larger scale incidents?



- The first responders to a UWIED or Mining incident in CONUS will be a local public safety bomb squad, assisted by FBI SABTs.
 - IF...Act of War / mining /conventional ordnance ...clearly responsibility of DOD
 - Even so, assistance will be needed from DOJ/Public Safety and USCG assets.
 - DOD assets rely upon PS Bomb Technicians and Dive Teams to conduct an educated assessment of situation and proper reconnaissance on devices found.
 - In a multi location attack scenario, DOJ/PS advise DOD on where assets most needed
 - IF...Act of terrorism / IED incident ... are more complex.
 - FBI has lead investigative responsibility
 - DHS (via USCG) has responsibility to protect/re-open ports
 - PSBS/SABTs are responsible for Render Safe of all IEDs in CONUS
 - DOD may or may not be needed as UWIED Render Safe SME's.
 - ♦ Responsibility differs from capability
 - ♦ Dependent upon scope and complexity of the problem
 - Standardized maritime training is needed to improve the skill level of PSBS, above and below water
 - Improve safety of technicians
 - More rapidly reduce hazard to public
 - Improve quality and consistency of information passed to DOD.

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Layered Maritime C-IED Response Interagency Spectrum



Maritime Capable PS Bomb Squad

- PS response above waterline (ports, ships, beach, etc)
- 100% of above water WBIED
- Requires minimal new equipment and training



Regional UHDT

- PS response below the waterline
 - 99% of UHDTs
- Less than 5% of PS Techs provide nationwide coverage
- Requires moderate amount of new equipment and training



USN EOD/MCM

- Ultimate backstop for complex UHDT situations
- Multiple location attack, complex UWIED, mil ordnance/limpets/ sea mines
- Requires extensive advanced equipment and training

GREATER

FREQUENCY

LESS

LESS

RESOURCE COMMITMENT

GREATER



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Guardian Management System



The Guardian Management System is Computerized investigative system that was created by the FBI on 09/11/2001 in response to the terrorist attack.

- The Guardian Management unit at FBIHQ is in charge of the program.
- The system is operational 24hours a day; 7 days a week
- Two versions of the system (classified and unclassified/e-Guardian)

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Guardian Management System



- It is a mechanism for the public to submit information via the Internet.
- Shares information with Federal, State and Local Law Enforcement and international partners.
- FBI analysts and agents read every tip and conduct preliminary research


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
Maritime Security Program (MSP)

Guardian Incident Reporting





MSP Guardian Incidents Reporting Trends and Patterns 01/01/2013 – 10/01/2014







MSP Guardian Incidents Reporting TARGETS



2013



2014



- Cruise Ship/Lines
- Port/Harbor Facilities
- Ferry
- Navy/Coast Guard
- Tanker
- Cargo



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
MSP Guardian Incidents Reporting Highest Incident Reporting



GULF OF MEXICO

2013

2014



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MSP Points of Contact

- **SSA Clinton J. Morano, FBI, 571-280-5450**
- **SSA William P. Hicks, CGIS, 571-280-5457**
- **IA Carla S. Matherson, FBI, 571-280-0622**

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