

Cyber Threats and the Marine Transportation System

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## The Evolving Threat...Call to Action



"Cybersecurity is one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face as a nation..."

- President Obama, February 2013



"All sectors of our country are at risk...the seriousness and the diversity of the threats that this country faces in the cyber domain are increasing on a daily basis."

- DNI Director Clapper, March 2013



"Cybersecurity is a matter of homeland security...we are all connected online and a vulnerability in one place can cause a problem in many other places...cybersecurity is one of our most important missions."

- Secretary Johnson, April 2014



"Cyber affects the full spectrum of Coast Guard operations...it cuts across every aspect of the Coast Guard. We all have a role in cybersecurity and protection of our networks, and we must treat them like the mission-critical assets that they are."


- Admiral Zukunft, September 2014






## Why the Maritime is Important

- 95% of all U.S. overseas trade through 360 ports
- \$1.3 trillion in cargo annually





- 7,000 oceangoing vessels made55,560 port calls annually
- Secure ports support Homeland Security and National Defense Ops





# **Intermodal Touch-points**



## Maritime Disruptions on MTS have proven costly

These incidents reflect cost of a maritime disruptions.

 These may not have been caused by a cyber-based failure, cyber incidents can have similar or greater consequences

○1989: Exxon Valdez, \$7+ billion dollars

o 2002: West Coast port shutdown, \$11 billion dollars

○ 2007: I-35W bridge collapse, \$300 million dollars

o 2010: Deepwater Horizon, \$37+ billion dollars


o 2013: USS Guardian, \$300 million dollars








# **Ships Then**








## **Ships Now**







# **Cargo Operations Then**





## **Cargo Operations Now**

Cargo handling equipment at the port/railway interface Commercial Long-Haul Trucks Port Security and Access Controls (physical, CCTV, gates, TWIC, ID cards)

Container
Cranes (or liquid
cargo handling
systems at oil,
chemical and
LNG terminals)
at vessel/port
interface

Automated cargo handling equipment, vehicles and similar conveyances

**Automated Cargo** 

**Container Tracking** 

Systems

Shore-based systems that directly support safe vessel operation and navigation:

- GPS
- Lock operation
- Communications
- Maintenance and management
- Systems aboard USCG vessels, tugs, fire boats, port police
- Pollution response systems


Terminal Operating Center (financial, communications, customs, security and other back office functions)





## Types of Cyber Threats We are Facing

- Hackers/IntrusionSets
- Phishing
- Social Engineering or Elicitation
- Malicious Code
- Watering Holes
- DDoS/SQL Injections
- Ransomware







## **Threat Actors**



**Nation States** 



Insiders



**Hacktivists** 



Criminals



**End Users** 





## Hackers Used to Facilitate Drug Smuggling

By breaking into the offices of a harbor company, the criminals could install key-loggers to take control of computers



Computers of container terminal were hacked so the containers that contained drugs could be monitored





### **MODUS OPERANDI**

1044 kilos cocaine/1099 kilos heroin

By means of false papers and a hacked pin code, the drivers were able to pick up the container at a location and time of their choosing




## **ECDIS Vulnerabilities**

#### Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS)

- Computer system usually installed on the bridge of a ship used for navigation
- Interconnected with numerous shipboard systems and sensors (AIS, NAVTEX, Speed Log, fathometer)
- Chart updates loaded via internet or CD/USB
- Penetration Testers found numerous security weaknesses including; ability to read, download, replace, or delete any file stored on the host server
- System could be penetrated directly or via one of the other systems linked to ECDIS

Source: CyberKeel 15 October 2014









## Cyber Attack – Cargo Data

#### What happened?

- Targeted attack against Iranian Shipping Line (IRISL)
- Damaged all date related to shipping rates, loading, cargo number, date and location
- Loss of company's internal communications network
- Significant disruptions in operations, severe financial losses

Source: CyberKeel 15 October 2014









# **Insider Threat – Malware via USB Device**

#### What happened?

- Targeted attack against refinery
- Disgruntled employee loaded malware on company computers
- Impact to business systems
- Remediation required 3<sup>rd</sup> party assistance






## Oil Rig Stability

#### What happened?

- Attacker managed to tilt floating oil rig off the coast of Africa
- Facility forced to shut down
- One week to identify cause and mitigate effects

Source: Reuters 23 April 2014







## **GPS Anomaly – Impact to facility operations**

#### What happened?

- GPS disruption lasting for over 7 hours
- Disruption caused two ship to shore cranes to cease operations due to lack of position data
- Operation of two additional cranes degraded







# WiFi Devices on Foreign Flagged Ships

Powerful WiFi devices detected on foreign flag ships

- Many antennas have a range of several miles
- Several antennas connected to computers running "password cracking" software













## Industrial Control Systems (ICS)

#### BlackEnergy


- Sophisticated campaign
- Ongoing since at least 2011
  - Highly modular
  - Targets human-machine interfaces (HMI)
- Modules search out networkconnected file shares and removable media for lateral movement


#### Havex

- Remote Access Trojan
- Multiple infection vectors (phishing, website redirects, watering hole attacks on ICS vendor websites)
  - Targeted energy and oil sectors
  - ICS/SCADA scanning














# FY-2014 ICS Incidents by Sector: Total 245




Energy Total = 79, 32%





## **FY-2014 ICS Incident Threat Actors**







## Types and Impacts of Exploiting ICS

# • Direct physical damage to affected equipment and systems...

 by exploiting an ICS, the controlled mechanism can fail with catastrophic results, damaging a single piece of equipment, interrupting a larger system, or disabling or destroying an entire ship.

#### Small-scale, local disruptions...

 which damage or interrupt individual systems or single ships within a single organization, without widespread impact beyond the affected function or service.

# Injury or death to operators, passengers or the general public.

 An incident can affect an single operator or a larger number of crewmembers or bystanders. Targeted attacks on a safetycritical safety can result in a fire or explosion that injures or kills hundreds.

#### Catastrophic disruptions to the transportation system.


 A vessel sunk in a shipping channel, an explosion at an oil or LNG facility, sabotage to canal locks, or a series of mishaps involving cargo container cranes in critical ports can have long-term impacts to the safety, stability and reliability of elements of the transportation system.

Volpe, 2013





## **ICS Best Practices – Modern Connectivity**







## **GPS Spoofing**

- University of Texas at Austin "Proof of Concept"
- Attacker transmitted spoofed GPS signal
- Signal overrode civilian GPS
- Obtained control over primary/back-up GPS (no alarms on radar, gyro, or compasses)
- "Attacker" gained navigational control of ship and redirected course









## It's the Simple Things

- Keep anti-virus software updated
- Keep software patched and updated
- Change default passwords/rotate user passwords
- Minimize number of "admin" accounts
- Educate and train your workforce
- Separate business and production systems

- Eliminate unnecessary data
- Study the threat landscape



"Some organizations will be a target <u>regardless</u> of what they do, but most become a target <u>because</u> of what they do.





# **NIST Voluntary Cybersecurity Framework**

- Voluntary federal cybersecurity standards developed by the National Institute for Standards and Technology in cooperation w/ the private sector
- Designed for owners and operators of CIKR...scalable to suite industry
- Focuses on;
  - Identify
  - Protect
  - Detect
  - Respond
  - Recover
- Complimented by the Critical Infrastructure Cyber Community program (C-Cubed)





## "C-Cubed" Voluntary Program

- Public/private partnership
- Aligns business enterprises to resources to assist with NIST adoption
- Assists with understanding the use of the NIST framework
- Feedback from stakeholders drives updates
- Aligns with the process/efforts outlined in the 2013 NIPP







## What's Out There...Training and Resources

#### **Web-Based Training**

- OPSEC for Control Systems
- Cybersecurity for Systems Engineers & Operators



#### **Self-Assessment**


Cyber Security Evaluation Tool (CSET)

#### **Instructor-Based Training**

Introductory/Intermediate/Advanced ICS

#### **On-Site Assistance**

Control Systems Security Program (CSSP)



For a complete list of available resources visit - http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov




## Final Thought...Saudi Aramco

- National oil company of Saudi Arabia
- One of the largest producers of oil in the world
- Targeted cyber attack
- Data destroying malware
- 30,000 computers turned into paperweights

What would your organization do if all of your company's computers stopped working?











# ACT Achieving Cybersecurity Together

"It's our Shared Responsibility".

















