Cybersecurity and the Marine Transportation System

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Convergence of Opportunities and Vulnerabilities
The Evolving Threat…Call to Action

“Cybersecurity is one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face as a nation…”
- President Obama, February 2013

“All sectors of our country are at risk…the seriousness and the diversity of the threats that this country faces in the cyber domain are increasing on a daily basis.”
- DNI Director Clapper, March 2013

“Cybersecurity is a matter of homeland security…we are all connected online and a vulnerability in one place can cause a problem in many other places…cybersecurity is one of our most important missions.”
- Secretary Johnson, April 2014

“Cyber affects the full spectrum of Coast Guard operations…it cuts across every aspect of the Coast Guard. We all have a role in cybersecurity and protection of our networks, and we must treat them like the mission-critical assets that they are.”
- Admiral Zukunft, September 2014
Maritime Critical Infrastructure

The Coast Guard is the Sector Specific Agency (SSA) for the Maritime component of the Transportation Sector

• 1 of the 16 Critical Sectors
• Collaboration with our partners in TSA and DOT
• Protect maritime sector from all threats (physical, personnel, and cyber)
Why the Maritime is Important

- 95% of all U.S. overseas trade through 360 ports
- $1.3 trillion in cargo annually
- 7,000 oceangoing vessels made 55,560 port calls annually
- Secure ports support Homeland Security and National Defense Ops
Intermodal Touch-points
Maritime Disruptions on MTS have proven costly

- These incidents reflect cost of a maritime disruptions.
- These may not have been caused by a cyber-based failure, cyber incidents can have similar or greater consequences

- 1989: Exxon Valdez, $7+ billion dollars
- 2002: West Coast port shutdown, $11 billion dollars
- 2007: I-35W bridge collapse, $300 million dollars
- 2010: Deepwater Horizon, $37+ billion dollars
- 2013: USS Guardian, $300 million dollars
Ships Then
Ships Now
Cargo Operations Then
Cargo Operations Now

- Cargo handling equipment at the port/railway interface
- Commercial Long-Haul Trucks
- Port Security and Access Controls (physical, CCTV, gates, TWIC, ID cards)
- Container Cranes (or liquid cargo handling systems at oil, chemical and LNG terminals) at vessel/port interface
- Automated cargo handling equipment, vehicles and similar conveyances
- Automated Cargo Container Tracking Systems
- Terminal Operating Center (financial, communications, customs, security and other back office functions)

Shore-based systems that directly support safe vessel operation and navigation:
- GPS
- Lock operation
- Communications
- Maintenance and management
- Systems aboard USCG vessels, tugs, fire boats, port police
- Pollution response systems
Types of Cyber Threats We are Facing

- Hackers/Intrusion Sets
- Phishing
- Social Engineering or Elicitation
- Malicious Code
- Watering Holes
- DDoS/SQL Injections
- Ransomware
Threat Actors

THREAT ACTORS

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

HACKTIVISTS

CRIMINAL ELEMENTS

TERRORIST ACTS

THREAT VECTORS

SUPPLY CHAIN VULNERABILITY

NEGLIGENT USERS

WIRELESS ACCESS POINTS

REMOVABLE MEDIA

INSIDER THREATS

Homeland Security
Hackers Used to Facilitate Drug Smuggling

By breaking into the offices of a harbor company, the criminals could install key-loggers to take control of computers.

Computers of container terminal were hacked so the containers that contained drugs could be monitored.

MODUS OPERANDI

1044 kilos cocaine/1099 kilos heroin

By means of false papers and a hacked pin code, the drivers were able to pick up the container at a location and time of their choosing.
ECDIS Vulnerabilities

Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS)

- Computer system usually installed on the bridge of a ship used for navigation
- Interconnected with numerous shipboard systems and sensors (AIS, NAVTEX, Speed Log, fathometer)
- Chart updates loaded via internet or CD/USB
- Penetration Testers found numerous security weaknesses including; ability to read, download, replace, or delete any file stored on the host server
- System could be penetrated directly or via one of the other systems linked to ECDIS

Source: CyberKeel 15 October 2014
Cyber Attack – Cargo Data

What happened?

• Targeted attack against Iranian Shipping Line (IRISL)

• Damaged all date related to shipping rates, loading, cargo number, date and location

• Loss of company’s internal communications network

• Significant disruptions in operations, severe financial losses

Source: CyberKeel 15 October 2014
Insider Threat – Malware via USB Device

What happened?

- Targeted attack against refinery
- Disgruntled employee loaded malware on company computers
- Impact to business systems
- Remediation required 3rd party assistance
Oil Rig Stability

What happened?

- Attacker managed to tilt floating oil rig off the coast of Africa
- Facility forced to shut down
- One week to identify cause and mitigate effects

Source: Reuters 23 April 2014
GPS Anomaly – Impact to facility operations

What happened?

• GPS disruption lasting for over 7 hours

• Disruption caused two ship to shore cranes to cease operations due to lack of position data

• Operation of two additional cranes degraded
WiFi Devices on Foreign Flagged Ships

Powerful WiFi devices detected on foreign flag ships

- Many antennas have a range of several miles
- Several antennas connected to computers running “password cracking” software
Industrial Control Systems (ICS)

BlackEnergy
- Sophisticated campaign
- Ongoing since at least 2011
  - Highly modular
- Targets human-machine interfaces (HMI)
- Modules search out network-connected file shares and removable media for lateral movement

Havex
- Remote Access Trojan
- Multiple infection vectors (phishing, website redirects, watering hole attacks on ICS vendor websites)
- Targeted energy and oil sectors
- ICS/SCADA scanning
FY-2014 ICS Incidents by Sector: Total 245

- Critical Manufacturing, 65 (27%)
- Energy, 79 (32%)
  - Energy Natural Gas, 23 (9%)
  - Energy Petroleum, 22 (9%)
  - Energy Electricity, 28 (11%)
- Transportation, 12 (5%)
- Water, 14 (6%)
- Unknown, 6 (2%)
- Chemical, 4 (2%)
- Commercial Facilities, 7 (3%)
- Communications, 14 (6%)
- Government Facilities, 13 (5%)
- Health Care, 15 (6%)
- Information Technology, 5 (2%)
- Nuclear, 6 (2%)
- Food and Ag, 2 (1%)
- Finance, 3 (1%)
- Energy Misc., 6 (2%)

Energy Total = 79, 32%
FY-2014 ICS Incident Threat Actors

- APT: 133, 55%
- Criminal: 9, 4%
- Hacktivists: 12, 5%
- Hacktivists (ICS): 17, 7%
- Insider (Non-Malicious): 1, 1%
- Malicious Insider: 1, 0%
- Unknown: 68, 28%
Types and Impacts of Exploiting ICS

• Direct physical damage to affected equipment and systems…
  – by exploiting an ICS, the controlled mechanism can fail with catastrophic results, damaging a single piece of equipment, interrupting a larger system, or disabling or destroying an entire ship.

• Small-scale, local disruptions…
  – which damage or interrupt individual systems or single ships within a single organization, without widespread impact beyond the affected function or service.

• Injury or death to operators, passengers or the general public.
  - An incident can affect an single operator or a larger number of crewmembers or bystanders. Targeted attacks on a safety-critical safety can result in a fire or explosion that injures or kills hundreds.

• Catastrophic disruptions to the transportation system.
  – A vessel sunk in a shipping channel, an explosion at an oil or LNG facility, sabotage to canal locks, or a series of mishaps involving cargo container cranes in critical ports can have long-term impacts to the safety, stability and reliability of elements of the transportation system.

Volpe, 2013
GPS Jamming and Personal Privacy Devices

- Increased use of Personal Privacy Devices (PPDs) to mask user position from GPS-based tracking systems
  - Employee tracking (Commercial Trucking Sector)
  - Personal tracking
  - Rental cars
  - Prisoners ankle bracelet
  - Stolen Vehicles - cars/trucks
  - Cell phones / Drug dealers
- Growing market for low-cost GPS jammers
  - Many devices are battery-operated or car into a cigarette lighter
- Examples: gpsjammers.net, jammer-store.com, chinavision.com, others
  - Manufactured in China and Europe

Volpe, 2013
GPS Spoofing

- University of Texas at Austin “Proof of Concept”
- Attacker transmitted spoofed GPS signal
- Signal overrode civilian GPS
- Obtained control over primary/back-up GPS (no alarms on radar, gyro, or compasses)
- “Attacker” gained navigational control of ship and redirected course
Final Thought...Saudi Aramco

- National oil company of Saudi Arabia
- One of the largest producers of oil in the world
- Targeted cyber attack
- Data destroying malware
- 30,000 computers turned into paperweights

What would your organization do if all of your company’s computers stopped working?
ACT
Achieving Cybersecurity Together

“It’s our Shared Responsibility”.